[Xymon] Encrypted Xymon reporting over SSL using stunnel
SebA
spah at syntec.co.uk
Tue Mar 12 18:16:39 CET 2019
Hi Bruce,
Yes, I've been using the same since 2002 as well, but I disagree on the
legal issue. The Apache licence is very free and so long as it is complied
with (which is mainly to do with trademarks) there are no problems with
it. Many commercial products integrate OS software that uses the Apache OS
licence, and Xymon is not commercial, it's open source too!
Look, I don't know if it's worth using their code or not - I happen to like
Python and can program in it (when I can't in C), but as you said, it's a
different language, it might not integrate well. I have seen some
communication issues with the Salt Stack, but they're mostly due to not
having the right firewall ports open. Anyway, the key generation and
encryption stuff is separate to the communication - Xymon communication
could still use the normal Xymon channel, but use key generation and
encryption ideas or code or libraries from somewhere else.
Kind regards,
SebA
On Tue, 12 Mar 2019 at 17:04, Bruce Ferrell <bferrell at baywinds.org> wrote:
> SebA
>
> I think mentioned this in another thread. I've been using BB/xymon/"that
> thing we can't say because an estate disliked it" since 2002.
>
> I think many of us went through the demise of BB when Quest/Dell/EMC
> absorbed/smothered it.
>
> Using code from a commercial entity (even with an apache license) raises
> the spector/risk of past debacles and in my opinion potentially puts a tool
> I really like and find useful
> at risk.
>
> Integrating functionality that already exists through well understood,
> more general mechanisms makes it special purpose functionality and THAT
> makes it less reliable... Especially
> in that SaltStack is really "just" an orchestrator written in Python (Py,
> in and of itself is enough for me to give it a pass... Very long story and
> ask me outside of this
> discussion about that). The difference in the codebase alone should cause
> someone to think very hard about that kind of merge.
>
> Looking more closely at SaltStack, I see it would add addition
> transports; MQ or RAET (yet another UDP based protocol... UDP, unreliable
> transport to increase
> security/reliability?!). MQ per the docs, uses HTTP/SSL and now we're
> back to certs and even further integration of some form HTTP server to do
> that!
>
> Maybe better documentation of secure message distribution? There used to
> be one on how to pull client updates via ssh. That's secure AND simple.
> It doesn't sign the updates but
> that could be a reasonable add-on to the documentation.
>
> For this purpose, SaltStack looks to me like that old Milton Bradley board
> game Mouse Trap.
>
>
> On 3/12/19 8:55 AM, SebA wrote:
> > There is a commercial version, but this code is open source:
> https://github.com/saltstack/salt
> > I wasn't saying we use their code - although if the licence says that
> other open source projects can use it, then it is worth considering. It
> looks like it's using the Apache
> > licence.
> >
> > Kind regards,
> >
> > SebA
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, 12 Mar 2019 at 15:10, Bruce Ferrell <bferrell at baywinds.org
> <mailto:bferrell at baywinds.org>> wrote:
> >
> > ...And looking even closer at saltstack, it's a commercial product,
> leading to a possible trigger of "that's ours! cross our palms with MUCH
> silver" (probably based on OSS, but
> > thats' never stopped anyone).
> >
> > Taking me back to "do it outside of xymon" for cleanliness sake.
> >
> >
> > On 3/12/19 6:50 AM, SebA wrote:
> > > The way Salt Minions authenticate and their keys have to be
> accepted on the Salt Master works pretty well. I don't believe they
> expire. It's been a while since I looked
> > at it,
> > > so I couldn't tell you exactly how it works, but there's some
> information here:
> > > https://docs.saltstack.com/en/getstarted/system/communication.html
> > > Anyway, that model would probably work pretty well for Xymon, so
> long as the reporting client is not ephemeral.
> > >
> > > Kind regards,
> > >
> > > SebA
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sat, 9 Mar 2019 at 02:10, Bruce Ferrell <bferrell at baywinds.org
> <mailto:bferrell at baywinds.org> <mailto:bferrell at baywinds.org <mailto:
> bferrell at baywinds.org>>> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > I'm not sure which standard is in use here, so I'll just top
> post like Richard did. Please don't shoot me.
> > >
> > >
> > > People always go for certs... And then they expire and stuff
> starts breaking or alerting right and left all at once. GACK!
> > >
> > > For real hilarity, make them expire ten years out. By that
> time, no one even remembers that certs were even installed or what they're
> for. As the home loan industry
> > said right
> > > before the big crash, IBG, UBG (I be gone, you be gone).
> > >
> > > From one who has had to deal with such mass silliness, take
> it from me, it's NO FUN and REALLY tedious to fix.
> > >
> > > "But I'll just use the cert for tunnel authentication" I hear
> you say... If in-authentic communication (even self signed) isn't denied,
> do we care if it's signed
> > really? If
> > > we do
> > > care then we deny communication/ignore messages. Now we've
> lost reporting links and visibility.
> > >
> > > Some form of message authentication is probably a good idea
> though. Just something that doesn't expire and can be revoked as needed.
> gpg/pgp keys maybe, but then we
> > get the
> > > issue
> > > of gpg/pgp key distribution/signing. Key per monitored
> system... Anyone want to manage THAT?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On 3/8/19 11:28 AM, Richard L. Hamilton wrote:
> > > > In the ideal, esp. when the client may have a dynamic IP
> address (DHCP without reserved addresses, or mobile clients, for example),
> it would IMO also be really good
> > if the
> > > client reports could optionally be signed, with a certificate
> the server could verify, to give some confidence as to their actually
> coming from the client...not that that
> > > assures that the actual client wasn't compromised, but it's
> better than nothing insofar as it at least gives good odds that misleading
> (or maliciously crafted) data from
> > > elsewhere isn't being provided.
> > > >
> > > >> On Mar 8, 2019, at 11:09, Axel Beckert <abe at deuxchevaux.org
> <mailto:abe at deuxchevaux.org> <mailto:abe at deuxchevaux.org <mailto:
> abe at deuxchevaux.org>>> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> Hi Ralph,
> > > >>
> > > >> On Fri, Mar 08, 2019 at 10:40:55AM -0500, Ralph Mitchell
> wrote:
> > > >>> I'd still like to see encrypted connections for Xymon
> client messages going
> > > >>> to the server.
> > > >> Yeah, this definitely is a feature which would be very nice
> to
> > > >> available out of the box.
> > > >>
> > > >> Nevertheless you can do that already now with stunnel as I
> mentioned:
> > > >>
> > > >>>> (And yes, I'm still hoping and waiting for IPv6 support,
> too,
> > > >>>> especially in xymonnet-based checks. Reporting to
> IPv6-only servers is
> > > >>>> no issue though, if you anyways use stunnel to encrypt the
> > > >>>> client-reporting traffic.)
> > > >> Debian's xymon package ships
> /usr/share/doc/xymon/README.encryption
> > > >> with hints how to implement encrypted reporting with Xymon.
> > > >>
> > > >> The current version can be found in our packaging git
> repository at
> > > >>
> https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xymon/blob/master/debian/README.encryption
> > > >> although I'm thinking about renaming it to
> README.encryption.md <http://README.encryption.md> <
> http://README.encryption.md> as I
> > > >> wrote it in Markdown syntax.
> > > >>
> > > >> It also refers to this more detailed documentation:
> > > >>
> https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/System_Monitoring_with_Xymon/Administration_Guide#Encryption_and_Tunnelling
> > > >>
> > > >> HTH!
> > > >>
> > > >> Kind regards, Axel
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Xymon mailing list
> > > Xymon at xymon.com <mailto:Xymon at xymon.com> <mailto:Xymon at xymon.com
> <mailto:Xymon at xymon.com>>
> > > http://lists.xymon.com/mailman/listinfo/xymon
> > >
> >
>
>
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